BothAndBlog Forum

Metaphysics Defined
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussi ... defined/p1

When can one define metaphysics? Is it possible to define metaphysics when possible?
I am interested in how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? ___Shawn

Apparently that 'aha' moment has happened for David Chalmers, but never for Daniel Dennett, who are the two main protagonists in the debate. — Wayfarer

The "Hard Problem" is hard for those who think in terms of Materialism. But, if you think that Information is more fundamental than Matter, "aha" the problem vanishes.

I don't think so. Maybe for philosophical materialists the 'problem of consciousness' is intractably "hard" but not for methodological materialists (e.g. neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, et al) as I point out here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussi ... ent/511358. — 180 Proof

I'm guessing that the age-old question of Consciousness is not a major problem for "methodical materialists" because they don't concern themselves with Qualia, being content to focus on Quanta. Feynman's motto of "shut-up and calculate" is a way of saying, "if you can't put a number on it, don't waste time worrying about it". Conscious minds are not a problem for empirical physicists, because Thoughts can't be dissected physically or defined numerically. Hence, they might agree with Dennett that Consciousness is not Real. Which is a truism, because it's Ideal.

Ironically, in the linked thread, you concluded : " I just can't take serious mysterians like Chalmers (or other panpsychists) who propose that the 'explanatory gap' is a "hard problem" for philosophy, which it is not, because philosophy itself is not (equipped to effectively engage) in the 'theoretical explanation' business." Which sounds ironic to me, because when empirical scientists propose "theoretical explanations" for their experimental results, they are engaging in Philosophy. They are "supposing" universal principles that are not experimentally observed, but rationally imagined. A theory, such as Darwin's is essentially a just-so story, which assumes that empirical evidence will eventually be found to support the generalized conjecture. Those who share your axioms and pre-conceptions will quickly "see" the overall implications of the theory, beyond what can be directly observed, and will fill-in-the-blanks with assumptions.

For those who think of Qualia in terms of Mental Objects (such as bits of knowledge), the "mystery" of the mind is more tractable. And the developments of Information Theory post-Shannon, provide mental tools for manipulating intangible objects. Moreover, IIT is a step toward quantifying those invisible bits & bytes of Meaning & Aboutness, so that even "methodological materialists" can shut-up and calculate. Even so, until Minds can be examined under a microscope, they will remain in the philosophical category of Meta-Physical.


Theory :
a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained.
Suppose :
assume that something is the case on the basis of evidence or probability but without proof or certain knowledge.
___Oxford Dictionary

Philosophy may be called the "science of sciences" probably in the sense that it is, in effect, the self-awareness of the sciences and the source from which all the sciences draw their world-view and methodological principles, which in the course of centuries have been honed down into concise forms
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is-sc ... philosophy

↪Gnomon
In my understanding, explaining some physical transformation manifested as a testable mathematical model is indispensible for doing science whereas interpreting such explanatory models and what the outcomes of testing them 'imply' about some aspect of the world (and, perhaps, the human condition) is doing philosophy. — 180 Proof

Yes. That distinction is relevant, in that technical "explanations" tell us How something works mechanically. But an "interpretation" of the same observation is an attempt to make sense of the How, in terms that are meaningful to non-specialists, including academic philosophers without laboratories. It always helps understanding to know something about Why it works like that. "How" is narrow & specific, while "Why" is broader & more general.

For example, I am currently reading a dense 700 page book written by a mathematical Astronomer and a Physicist. The first part of the book is a general history of the topic, written in layman's language. So, you could call it an "interpretation" of how, over centuries of observation, scientists and philosophers were led to the notion of a universal Principle of the Universe. Then, the middle part is written in complex mathematical notation, which is a foreign language for me. So, I must take their word for it, that those equations "explain" the Hows of astronomy and physics. But, I hope the third part will return to more colloquial language, in order to "interpret" those technical findings for the non-expert. Parts 1 and 3 are philosophical in nature, while part 2 is more scientific. Although I am not an expert in these fields, I still try to skim the technical "explanations", then move-on to the more meaningful (to me) "interpretations".

Of course other scientists may not agree with their philosophical "interpretation". Some even call it "Woo". But the authors include enough of the gobbledygook, that anyone so inclined can check to see if it's based on "hard science". It's like the Copenhagen Interpretation of the mind-boggling implications of Quantum Theory, except that their canonical version was intended to explain its absurdities & anomalies for the experts, not the general public. For the layman, they must resort to metaphorical philosophical language : ocean waves and solid particles are easier to imagine than purely mathematical waves and virtual fields.

That is a common misunderstanding of Dennett by his critics who apparently haven't even bothered to read his works. He doesn't deny that it's real, he just says that it isn't what we folksily think it is. If you say consciousness is not real then you are actually committing the very error you mistakenly attribute to Dennett. What could it mean to say it is ideal other than that it is merely an idea? — Janus

Yes. I've read several of Dennett's books, and his arguments are very clear. But, in calling Consciousness an "illusion", he was basically explaining it away. He's saying, C is not what you think it is. And for most people it's the Soul (the essence of me). So, what he's saying is that Souls are not real, "merely an idea", hence not important. I happen to agree that the "soul" is an idea, an image representing the Self. But, I disagree about its importance to humans, since C is all we know about Self and World. As Descartes concluded, thinking is what I am. A thinking being is not just Real, it's Ideal.

So long as science was able to stick to the story that the so-called material ultimates were real, then well and good, as far as they're concerned; but that was exactly what was undermined by quantum physics. All of the 'spooky action at a distance' and 'God playing dice' and the rest. But of course, if you so much as refer to any of that, then you're 'peddling woo'. — Wayfarer

Yes. Since Quantum Theory undermined Atomism, along with the fundamental assumptions of Materialism, scientists and philosophers have been scrambling to re-interpret some of the spooky-woo elements of QT. But, not being a born-again Atheist, and being not fully committed to the materialistic worldview, I finally decided to give-in to the implications of that emerging paradigm, and accept that Reality may not be what it appears to be, to the physical eye. That "enlightenment" didn't turn me on to any particular religion, but I gave me new respect for some of the ancient thinkers, who tried to make sense of the weirdness of the world. Besides, if spooky-action-at-a-distance and quantum-leaps ain't woo, I don't know what is.

Reality Is Not What It Seems :
___Carlo Rovelli
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality_I ... t_It_Seems

The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality :
___Donald Hoffman
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-evol ... -20160421/

I disagree. QT has only "undermined" John Dalton, not Democritus. — 180 Proof

As they say, "you are welcome to your opinion" on any topic. What was John Dalton's opinion of Atomism? Atomism has metamorphosed over the centuries from solid balls of stuff, to a tiny planetary system, to the notion of empty space with statistical potential for virtual particles. At the same time, the Mechanical models of reality have been superseded by a bizarre array of specialized Forces, and Spooky Action at a Distance.

All I meant by the "undermined" remark was that QT has replaced hard little Atoms (matter) with amorphous Fields (mathematics) as the current canonical fundamental element of reality. So a Google search will return several uses of the term "undermined", or equivalent, to label the relationship of AtomicTheory (balls) to Quantum particles (waveforms). Anyway, snarky remarks won't really convince anyone on this forum that your opinion is the correct one.

Atomism from the 17th to the 20th Century :
Newtonian atomism was a speculation that at least held the promise of explaining material phenomena in a way that mechanical atomism did not and so experimental support in the future was a possibility. A critic, on the other hand, could argue that, from the philosophical perspective, the introduction of force undermined the case for the clarity and intelligibility of mechanical atomism on which its originators had based their case. From a scientific point of view, there was no significant empirical support for atomism and it was unable to offer useful guidance to the experimental sciences that grew and prospered in the seventeenth century and beyond.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-modern/

What does it matter? He called a phenomenon an "atom" that is, in fact, not "uncuttable" (i.e. indivisible) as classical atomists conceptualized it. Dalton used a misnomer that then stuck which subsequent particle physics exposed as, at best, premature when he had first used it. Your question, Gnomon, makes no sense either in the context (with a link too) from which you quoted me. — 180 Proof

That question was rhetorical, and not intended to to elicit an answer. But you seemed to drop his name as an expert on the topic under discussion. Your responses on this thread about Metaphysics mostly seem to be defensive, rather than contributing to a relevant definition of the term. So a pertinent question is, what are you defending? Physics from Metaphysics, Reality from Ideality?

I just read an interview in the current issue of Philosophy Now magazine, that may apply to your attempt to draw a hard line between those categories of human thought. Sociologist Martin Savransky talks about Pragmatism and "pluralistic realism". He says that some realisms are "profoundly concerned with the question of how to draw the line between what is real and what is not. In a sense, each form of realism is its own way of drawing that line. But that, to my mind, ends up transforming realism into a belligerent gesture." He goes on to explain his notion of "pluralistic realism". "I'm more interested in problematizing the very distinction between reality and unreality, not by claiming there is no such thing as real, but rather by wagering that everything" -- including metaphysics??? -- "is in some sense real, and not just what is deemed 'independent of us'."

But of course, he's a sociologist-philosopher -- not a real scientist . . .

Wayfarer's pedantic dishonesty and smug evasiveness are as shameless as they are legendary. Warranted observation, not an "ad hominem", W. — 180 Proof

180, your defenses of Science and Realism are mostly attacks on the messenger, whom you deem "pedantic" etc, not on his message. If that is not "ad hominem", then what kind of philosophical argument is it? What are we supposed to learn from your characterization of Wayfarer, except that "realistic scientists should not trust anything he says"? If the quote above is "not an ad hominem", then what does it reveal about the legitimate philosophical topic of Metaphysics? Was Aristotle pedantic, dishonest, smug, evasive and shameless?

Pedantic is an insulting word used to describe someone who annoys others by correcting small errors, caring too much about minor details, or emphasizing their own expertise especially in some narrow or boring subject matter.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pedantic

Kant's Concept of Metaphysics :
Still the fact that Kant does not face Aristotle's theory of metaphysics has some deeper reasons too. ... (a) Metaphysics is the science containing the first grounds or the principal truths of all human knowledge. This can be called the nominal definition of metaphysics as put forth by Meier and the school he belonged to.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23936829

Both Wayfarer and @180 Proof are long-standing and productive members of TPF.
So why all this increased aggro right now ? — Amity

I get the impression that polarized arguments (as opposed to mutually respectful dialogs), such as this Physics versus Metaphysics thread, is more political than philosophical : e.g. Conservative vs Liberal. It's typically "couched-in" accusations, instead of propositions. Materialists & Realists seem to feel that their ideology is under attack by the forces of evil (i.e. Idealists & woo-mongers). I suppose the animosity, revealed in ad hominem attacks (sorry, "True, corroborated, statements") are another sad sign of the times. The belligerent attitudes of some posters remind me of a Trump rally.

couched in : to express something in carefully chosen or deceptive words.
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/couched+in

↪Gnomon
:gasp: Ouch! That one's below belt ... — 180 Proof

Truth hurts! :joke: