BothAndBlog Forum

Is causation linguistic rather than in the world?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussi ... ent/748431


It seems most people who write about causation take causation to be ‘in the world’ in some way, as some sort of force or a relationship (e.g. perhaps regularity as per Hume) between things in the world or something like that. I think probability raising would be covered by this seeing as we’re talking about probabilities of things in the world.
Perhaps causation is a relationship between a WORD for a thing in the world and the FACT of another thing in the world.
What do you think? Could causation be a relationship between words and things rather than things and things? — invizzy

Perhaps the linguistic confusion you are referring to is due in part to the use of a single English word, "cause", to translate Aristotle's four causal relationships. Today, we usually think of "Causation" in terms of Energy. But for Ari, the word "energeia" simply meant objective (productive) physical "work", and "ation" meant a subjective rational explanation, a reason, a why. We observe the Fact of change, and then explain it in Words.

Apparently, he thought of Causation in terms of changed relationships on several levels of being, such as before & after, which could be either intentional (artificial) or accidental (natural). The most basic relationship is between a "Material" substance (physical properties) and its shape (formal properties) : natural metallic bronze vs culturally-enformed statue. Next, is the "Formal" relationship between the old & new shape : accidental (natural) rock shape vs designed sculpture shape. Then, the sculptor's mental design intent, the "why", is what he means by the "Final" cause.

However, our modern scientific notion of Causation puts the emphasis in the middle, on the "Efficient" cause, which in most cases involves the application of Energy to an object or substance. Natural change is presumed to be random & accidental, while Cultural change is intentional & teleological. It mentally envisions the future state or shape, toward which to aim in the process of applying efficient causation to the material cause. Plan the work, then do the work.

The bottom line is that Aristotle's four causes cover the full range of possible causal relationships : for example, 1> between natural state & artificial state ; 2> original observed form & final imagined form ; 3> between physical force & material bronze ; 4> between innate shape & envisioned alternative (designed) shape. The pre-change state is an observed Fact, while the envisioned state is an imaginary future Fact. The first is a sensory Thing, the second is a mental Idea of a thing.

Plato & Aristotle used the term LOGOS ("word") in reference to rationally caused change, as opposed to natural (factual) change. Our modern language seems to have trouble making such philosophical distinctions. Which may be why Quantum Physics seems so paradoxical & counterintuitive. The Mind of the observer/causer was left out of the equation.

WHAT WAS THE SCULPTOR THINKING ?
https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-VYYbQDJ-l5w/ ... 600/_5.png

her target is more determinism than causation, but there is a firm attack on the " ‘Always when this, then that’" (final paragraph) that ↪Gnomon and ↪Agent Smith
seem to advocate. It irritates me because (!) I maintain some sympathy for Davidson's treatment of human actions in causal terms. — Banno

" ‘Always when this, then that’" sounds like absolute Determinism, or Fatalism. But Gnomon "advocates" Compatibilism : freedom within determinism. It assumes that human Will is a non-natural (artificial) Cause. By that I mean, human Culture has found ways to modify natural causation, to suit their own needs & desires. Would Nature put men on the Moon or Mars?

Can you summarize Anscombe's "attack", and Davidson's "treatment"? Do they argue in favor of human FreeWill -- sometimes but not always pre-determined? Is their approach physical or linguistic or noetic?


Compatibilism is the doctrine that determinism is logically compatible or consistent with what is said to be a single idea of freedom that really concerns us and with a related kind of moral responsibility -- the freedom in question being voluntariness.
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwTerminology.html

Freewill within Determinism :
Science depends on predictable determinism. But philosophy looks for unpredictable unique meanings : "the difference that makes a difference". Free choice interferes with the smooth flow of cause & effect determinism, because it introduces an element of non-random novelty, directed toward self-interest. Even an if-then dichotomy, in a complex system, becomes a multiple-choice question. In a computer, a diode is a simple either-or choice, with no chance for conflict. But in a self-conscious person, each fork in the road has two viable options, the predetermined path or My Way. After countless steps up the ladder from energy exchange, to information flow, to knowledge transfers, metaphysical Consciousness gradually evolves from Quantum Physics.
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page33.html

Addendum : Reasons as Causes In that paper Davidson sets out to defend the view that the explanation of action by reference to reasons (something we do, for instance, when we refer to an agent’s intentions or motives in acting) is also a form of causal explanation
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/

That out of the way, it's true that the mechanisms of causation themselves are a series of intermediate causal claims. — Agent Smith

I just read in Werner Heisenberg's book, Physics and Philosophy, that "causality can only explain later events by earlier events, but it can never explain the beginning". The First Cause.

Anscombe points out that determinism is an impossible, or at least quite unnecessary, goal for physics.
One does not need compatibilism if cause does not necessitate determination. IF the physical world is not a clockwork mechanism - and it seems it is not - then there is room for free will without resort to compatiblism. — Banno

I'm guessing that Anscombe's assertion that "determinism is impossible" was based on Quantum Probability, Uncertainty and Indeterminacy. But early Quantum physicists (e.g. Einstein) argued that "god does not play dice". The implication being that Classical physics was based on an uninterrupted causal chain (i.e. no miracles). Eventually, Quantum physicists grudgingly revised their classical worldview, to include a bit of indeterminism, as long as it was confined to the invisible quantum level of reality.

From that acccomodative perspective, the universe is still viewed as mostly mechanical & deterministic, but with minor glitches in some of the smaller clockwork cogs. On the scale of Cosmology though, scientists also have to deal with incomplete knowledge of initial conditions : the original setting of the clock. Nevertheless, most physicists act as-if they believe that indeterminacy is an exception to the rule. Hence, free-will philosophers are still challenged to specify some kind of causes to fill any presumed minor gaps in the chain of cause & effect. So, human agency must be somehow justified as compatible with general/universal energy-mediated Causation.

I looked up Donald Davidson to see what he had to say about FreeWill. His notion of "reasons as causes" seems to be compatible with my own concept of Freedom within Determinism, in which human Reason has evolved into a non-physical causal agency that can have physical effects (e.g. to put a man on the moon). What he calls 'reasons" are based on purposeful teleological concepts of a future state that results from human "intentions or motives", rather than natural forces.

Even so, human culture is still working within the general constraints of physics. As President Kennedy said, "we want to go to the moon, not because it is easy, but because it is hard". Collective human Will, finds ways to overcome physical obstacles, not by ignoring physics, but by learning to leverage physics in ways that are un-natural, (i.e. Cultural), but compatible.


Reasons as Causes :
Davidson’s first major philosophical publication was the seminal paper ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ (1963). In that paper Davidson sets out to defend the view that the explanation of action by reference to reasons (something we do, for instance, when we refer to an agent’s intentions or motives in acting) is also a form of causal explanation. Indeed, he argues that reasons explain actions just inasmuch as they are the causes of those actions. This approach was in clear opposition to the Wittgensteinian orthodoxy of the time.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#ReasCaus

I'm guessing that Anscombe's assertion that "determinism is impossible" was based on Quantum Probability, — Gnomon
No.
There remains the possibility of your reading the article rather than guessing. — Banno

I did scan the article, but its circuitous reasoning lost me. So, I was hoping you could summarize how she arrived at the bold "assertion that determinism is impossible". In the quote below, it sounds like she was saying that the "inventions of indeterministic physics" are merely linguistic "dogma" instead of a physical fact. What's your guess? Is classical determinism a natural fact, or just a philosophical metaphor to fill-in our ignorance of what's really going on in the world?

My own understanding of Causation is expressed in terms of Mathematical & Logical relationships. Even causal Energy is defined in terms of Proportions & Ratios (E=MC^2 ; where C is a dimensionless number). Since our knowledge of Math is mental instead of sensory -- inferred instead of observed -- it makes sense to me that human reasoning & intentions could have some effect on those causal relationships. In which case, I could say that "orderly determinism is normal & probable, but abnormal (intentional) deviations (indeterminism) are statistically possible". I just made that up, so don't hold me to it.

Causation (philosophy) :
Relation that holds between two temporally simultaneous or successive events when the first event (the cause) brings about the other (the effect).
https://www.britannica.com/topic/causation

Hume on Causation :
Causation is a relation between objects that we employ in our reasoning in order to yield less than demonstrative knowledge of the world beyond our immediate impressions.
Note -- Hume's problem of Induction reminds us that our reasoning from-this-to-that is fallible, hence some skepticism is advisable. But to conclude that "determinism is impossible" would cripple the disciplines of Science & Philosophy. Yet, to infer that "determinism is inevitable" would deny the universal human assumption of free choice, upon which our personal behavior & communal culture are based.

Anscombe :
Yet my argument lies always open to the charge of appealing to
ignorance.. . . .
It has taken the inventions of indeterministic physics to shake the
rather common dogmatic conviction that determinism is a
presupposition, or perhaps a conclusion, of scientific knowledge.
https://iweb.langara.ca/rjohns/files/20 ... sality.pdf

Further, your use of "circuitous" indicates some antipathy. And I've already suggested that her first argument is that the notion of causation remains undefined, — Banno

I had never heard of Anscombe or her absolute assertion that "determinism is impossible". So, I couldn't have approached the article with antipathy -- more like curiosity. Anyway, if she is going to reach a definitive conclusion about causation & determinism, why would she be content to leave her subject undefined, or undefinable? What kind of argument is that? If she had said, more modestly, "determinism is not inevitable", I would have to agree.

From their historical experience, ancient humans seemed to believe that divine causation was inevitable. Hence the pessimistic (or heroic) attitude of Fatalism. But, I doubt that modern physicists were fatalists. Instead, to them, Classical Determinism merely meant that Causation was consistent enough to make practical (or pragmatic) projections into the future course of events. Yet. Quantum Physicists were perplexed by the inherently unpredictable nature of quantum events. That's why Heisenberg proposed his Uncertainty Principle, to introduce a bit of Doubt into Determinism. Nevertheless, quantum physicists still use Schrodinger's equation to make useful predictions, despite the inherent margin of error.

On the macro scale of human experience, consistent causal Determinism seems to be reliable -- to a high degree of certainty -- as illustrated in the DART experiment sending a missile to intercept the path of an asteroid ten months into the future, and thousands of miles from Earth. So, to say that "determinism is impossible" seems to be a bit extravagant, even though we now know it is not inevitable. Instead, human FreeWill (purposeful action) seems to allow us to choose "different paths" to destiny, which modifies, but does not deny the general rule of Cause & Effect.

Therefore, I would say that Determinism is generally how the randomly interacting physical world works, but for rational humans the purposeful mental world introduces both Linguistic (Mental) & Physical degrees of freedom into the chain of Cause & Effect. That's because willful Intention, for all practical purposes, is a goal-directed form of causal Energy. It's not just the ability to do haphazard work, but to cause specific desirable changes in the world.


Fatalism vs Determinism :
In short, fatalism is the theory that there is some destiny that we cannot avoid, although we are able to take different paths up to this destiny. Determinism, however, is the theory that the entire path of our life is decided by earlier events and actions.
https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/10942 ... -fatalism/

Determinism Is Not Just Causality :
Determinism is more than belief in causality. The defining feature of determinism is a belief in the inevitability of causality. The essence of determinism is that everything that happens is the only thing that could possibly happen (given the past) under those circumstances.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... -causality

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is any of a variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a fundamental limit to the accuracy with which the values for certain pairs of physical quantities of a particle, such as position, x, and momentum, p, can be predicted from initial conditions. . . . It is vital to illustrate how the principle applies to relatively intelligible physical situations since it is indiscernible on the macroscopic scales that humans experience.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

Mental versus Physical Causation :
Pragmatic science assumes that anything not detectable by our physical senses, or by their mechanical extensions, is unreal — merely a side effect of brain operations. That materialistic presumption also applies to causality, in which physical events are predictably followed by effects in the real world; but, non-physical events, such as conscious thoughts, are effective only within the body. Those metaphysical activities are called "brain functions", and while personally useful, they are not in the mainstream of objective causation. Nevertheless, for ordinary humans, they are not mere side-effects, but our direct link to reality.
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page69.html
s

Further, your use of "circuitous" indicates some antipathy. And I've already suggested that her first argument is that the notion of causation remains undefined, — Banno

I had never heard of Anscombe or her absolute assertion that "determinism is impossible". So, I couldn't have approached the article with antipathy -- more like curiosity. Anyway, if she is going to reach a definitive conclusion about causation & determinism, why would she be content to leave her subject undefined, or undefinable? What kind of argument is that? If she had said, more modestly, "determinism is not inevitable", I would have to agree.

From their historical experience, ancient humans seemed to believe that divine causation was inevitable. Hence the pessimistic (or heroic) attitude of Fatalism. But, I doubt that modern physicists were fatalists. Instead, to them, Classical Determinism merely meant that Causation was consistent enough to make practical (or pragmatic) projections into the future course of events. Yet. Quantum Physicists were perplexed by the inherently unpredictable nature of quantum events. That's why Heisenberg proposed his Uncertainty Principle, to introduce a bit of Doubt into Determinism. Nevertheless, quantum physicists still use Schrodinger's equation to make useful predictions, despite the inherent margin of error.

On the macro scale of human experience, consistent causal Determinism seems to be reliable -- to a high degree of certainty -- as illustrated in the DART experiment sending a missile to intercept the path of an asteroid ten months into the future, and thousands of miles from Earth. So, to say that "determinism is impossible" seems to be a bit extravagant, even though we now know it is not inevitable. Instead, human FreeWill (purposeful action) seems to allow us to choose "different paths" to destiny, which modifies, but does not deny the general rule of Cause & Effect.

Therefore, I would say that Determinism is generally how the randomly interacting physical world works, but for rational humans the purposeful mental world introduces both Linguistic (Mental) & Physical degrees of freedom into the chain of Cause & Effect. That's because willful Intention, for all practical purposes, is a goal-directed form of causal Energy. It's not just the ability to do haphazard work, but to cause specific desirable changes in the world.


Fatalism vs Determinism :
In short, fatalism is the theory that there is some destiny that we cannot avoid, although we are able to take different paths up to this destiny. Determinism, however, is the theory that the entire path of our life is decided by earlier events and actions.
https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/10942 ... -fatalism/

Determinism Is Not Just Causality :
Determinism is more than belief in causality. The defining feature of determinism is a belief in the inevitability of causality. The essence of determinism is that everything that happens is the only thing that could possibly happen (given the past) under those circumstances.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... -causality

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is any of a variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a fundamental limit to the accuracy with which the values for certain pairs of physical quantities of a particle, such as position, x, and momentum, p, can be predicted from initial conditions. . . . It is vital to illustrate how the principle applies to relatively intelligible physical situations since it is indiscernible on the macroscopic scales that humans experience.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

Mental versus Physical Causation :
Pragmatic science assumes that anything not detectable by our physical senses, or by their mechanical extensions, is unreal — merely a side effect of brain operations. That materialistic presumption also applies to causality, in which physical events are predictably followed by effects in the real world; but, non-physical events, such as conscious thoughts, are effective only within the body. Those metaphysical activities are called "brain functions", and while personally useful, they are not in the mainstream of objective causation. Nevertheless, for ordinary humans, they are not mere side-effects, but our direct link to reality.
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page69.html
s

↪Gnomon
Hmm. There's not a lot of point in continuing a conversation about an article that you won't read. Your comments do not mesh with the article, nor with what I wrote about the article,
Anscombe does not deny causation. She denies determinism. She carefully examines several ways in which the word is used and shows them to be wanting. So your pointing to examples of causation is besides the point.
She also carefully distinguishes causation and determinism, something I do not see in your posts. — Banno

Sorry. I didn't mean to offend you. I was just quibbling with Anscombe's definitive statement : "determinism is impossible". That's what we do on TPF isn't it : quibble? "She denies determinism". I don't. However, I do see a philosophical place for limited FreeWill within a general milieu of Causation & Determinism. If "determinism is impossible" then empirical Science is impossible. And if FreeWill is impossible, then human Culture is impotent. I was merely arguing in favor of human Intention as one of many causes in the world. So, if she had said "determinism is not inevitable" I would have no quibble.

She also "distinguishes causation and determinism", which seems to be a linguistic quibble. The OP asks if causation is just a word (belief) with no referent in reality. Perhaps in Linguistic Philosophy that interpretation is meaningful. But in Scientific Philosophy, the word "causation" should have a solid grounding in physics. Admittedly, inevitable Determinism is a belief, not a verified fact. But it's a belief based on lots of objective evidence. However, Freewill is also a belief, and based on personal subjective experience. It's the lack of empirical evidence that allows some to deny the common belief in FreeWill.

You seemed to assume that I was arguing in favor of strict Determinism. Which is just the opposite of my intent. I suppose, if you interpret her argument to be not just against absolute Determinism, but also in favor of relative Freedom, I could agree. But, if that's what she meant, I missed it in my perusal. I did a search for "freewill" in the article, and found only one instance. So, the point of the article seemed to be mostly a linguistic quibble between Causation & Determinism, not an attempt to show that FreeWill is possible.

Causality vs Determinism :
Determinism is more than belief in causality. The defining feature of determinism is a belief in the inevitability of causality. The essence of determinism is that everything that happens is the only thing that could possibly happen (given the past) under those circumstances
https://www.google.com/search?client=fi ... eterminism
Note-- If you interpret human Intention as a form of causation, then there is no need to postulate a gap in the chain of causation. Hence, natural Determinism is supplemented with cultural Intention.

Anscombe :
"It was natural that when physics went indeterministic, some thinkers should have seized on this
indeterminism as being just what was wanted for defending the freedom of the will".
https://iweb.langara.ca/rjohns/files/20 ... sality.pdf
Note -- that is just what some philosophers did -- equating quantum indeterminism with human freedom. But, to empirical scientists that sounds like a Quantum Leap of Faith over the lack of evidence. So, I'm content with a non-empirical (theoretical ; philosophical) justification of FreeWill.
7

The only offence is your ongoing refusal to directly address the article you are pretending to critique — Banno

I'm not dialoging with Anscombe. So, my intention was not to critique her article, but the statement you quoted from it. I was trying to dialog with Banno. Assuming you agreed with it, I was hoping you would defend that quote. My interest was in the definitive dismissal of Causal Determinism, not in pursuing off-topic "irrelevancies". Sorry to have wasted your time. But I have learned something from this one-sided dialog.

PS__I once used the Galton board of bouncing balls to argue in favor of Freedom from Determinism. But my interlocutor was not buying it. So, I moved on to other arguments.

"In the last issue, John Hartung rejected my clumsy attempt at a mechanical
analogy to human freedom within a context of determinism. Specifically, he defined
"free will" in terms of "purpose", which is a property of living beings, not of ping pong
balls. Nevertheless, he still seems to believe that even human beings have no personal
freedom, hence no more purpose in life than a ping pong ball. Unfortunately, I failed to
clearly show that personal purpose is the very thing that elevates human actions above the
purely mechanical cause and effect system envisioned by Mr. Hartung".

Galton%20Board%20World%20Fair%2050%20(2019_07_22%2001_41_54%20UTC).jpg

↪Gnomon
As if choosing freely were the same as choosing randomly. — Banno

Yes. The Galton illustration of randomness within the normal curve of statistical determination does not take into account Intentional choices. Instead, the fundamental randomness, or uncertainty, on the quantum scale of physics, merely indicates that causal Determinism, although the norm, is not absolute. Thus providing gaps (statistical uncertainty) to be exploited by Intentional Causation.

I'm currently reading Werner Heisenberg's book, Physics and Philosophy. There he makes a statement that, at first glance, sounds similar to Anscombe's denial of Causality & Determinism : "The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory". But then, he goes on to say, "Therefore, the law of causality is reduced to the method of scientific research ; it is the condition which makes science possible. Since we actually apply this method, the law of causality is 'a priori' and is not derived from experience".

By "a priori" he means intuitive & logical. But his own Uncertainty Principle implies that the logical natural "law" of Causation is somewhat flexible. In my own theory of Freedom within Determinism, the natural world has produced a new kind of causation : human Intention (Will). And history records many instances of culture (including Science) modifying the natural course of causation. Nevertheless, the current ecological crises indicate that un-natural (artificial) causation may conflict with, but does not negate the normal processes of natural laws governing Cause & Effect. The bottom line is that human behavior & choices & effects are somewhat unpredictable, from merely extending past causal norms into the near future.

Statistical Uncertainty :
Uncertainty in statistics is measured by the amount of error in an estimate of the mean or average value of a population.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/environmen ... statistics

The uncertainty principle implies that it is in general not possible to predict the value of a quantity with arbitrary certainty, even if all initial conditions are known.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle