BothAndBlog Forum

The Meta-management Theory of Consciousness
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussi ... ent/895692

The Meta-management Theory of Consciousness uses the computational metaphor of cognition to provide an explanation for access consciousness, and by doing so explains some aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness. For example, it provides explanations for:

1) intentionality of consciousness - why consciousness "looks through" to first-order perceptions etc.
2) causality - that consciousness is "post-causal" - having no causal power over the event to which we are conscious, but having direct causal effect on subsequent events.
3) limited access - why we only have conscious experience associated with certain aspects of brain processing. — Malcolm Lett

I'm not competent to critique your theory, much less to "roast" it. So, I'll just mention a few other attempts at computer analogies to human sentience.

The April issue of Scientific American magazine has an article by George Musser entitled A Truly Intelligent Machine. He notes that "researchers are modeling AI on human brains". And one of their tools is modularity : mimicking the brain's organization into "expert" modules, such as language and spatio-visual, which normally function independently, but sometimes merge their outputs into the general flow of cognition. He says, "one provocative hypothesis is that consciousness is the common ground". This is a reference to Global Workspace Theory (GWT) in which specialty modules, e.g. math & language, work together to produce the meta-effect that we experience as Consciousness. Although he doesn't use the fraught term, this sounds like Holism or Systems Theory.

Musser asks, in reference to GWT computers, "could they inadvertently create sentient beings with feelings and motivations?" Then, he quotes the GWT inventor, "conscious computing is a hypothesis without a shred of evidence". In GWT, the function of Meta-management might be to integrate various channels of information into a singular perspective. When those internal sub-streams of cognition are focused on solving an external problem, we call it "Intention". And when they motivate the body to act with purpose to make real-world changes, we may call it "Causality". Some robots, with command-line Intentions and grasping hands, seem to have the autonomous power to cause changes in the world. But the ultimate goal of their actions can be traced back to a human programmer.

In 1985, computer theorist Marvin Minsky wrote The Society of Mind, postulating a collection of "components that are themselves mindless" that might work together to produce a Meta-manager (my term) that would function like human Consciousness. In his theory, their modular inputs & outputs would merge into a Stream of Consciousness (my term). Yet one book review noted that : "You have to understand that, for Minsky, explaining intelligence is meaningless if you cannot show a line of cookie crumbs leading from the 'intelligent' behavior to a set of un-intelligent processes that created it. Clearly, if you cannot do that, you have made a circular argument." {my italics}

In computer engineer/philosopher Bernardo Kastrup's 2020 book, Science Ideated, he distinguishes between "consciousness and meta-consciousness". Presumably, basic sentience is what we typically label as "sub-consciousness". He then notes that meta-C is a re-representation of subconscious elements that are directed by Awareness toward a particular question or problem. He also discusses the counterintuitive phenomenon of "blindsight", in which patients behave as-if they see something, but report that they were not consciously aware of the object. This "limited access" may indicate that a> subconscious Cognition and b> conscious Awareness are instances of a> isolated functions of particular neural modules, and b> integrated functions of the Mind/Brain system as a whole.

the counterintuitive phenomenon of "blindsight", in which patients behave as-if they see something, but report that they were not consciously aware of the object — Gnomon
Maybe you missed the link posted by "wonderer1" ... — 180 Proof

Thanks for the link. https://aeon.co/essays/how-blindsight-a ... sciousness

The article is interesting, and it may offer some insight as to why the Consciousness problem is "hard". The notes below are for my personal record, and may interpret the article's implications differently from yours.

The article refers to Blindsight as a "dissociation" (disconnection) between physical Perception (biological processing of energetic inputs) and metaphysical Sensation*1 (conception ; awareness) {my italics added}. And that seems to be where easy physics (empirical evidence) hands-off the baton of significance (semiotics) to hard meta-physics (non-physical ; mental ; rational ; ideal). Apparently the neural sensory networks are still working, but the transition from physical Properties to metaphysical Qualia doesn't happen*2.

Of course, my interpretation, in terms of metaphysics, may not agree with your understanding of the "phenomenon" which lacks the noumenon (perceived, but not conceived). The author suddenly realized that "Perhaps the real puzzle is not so much the absence of sensation in blindsight as its presence in normal sight?" That's the "Hard Problem" of Consciousness.

The article describes a primitive visual system that evolved prior to warm-blooded mammals, in which the cortex may represent a social context for the incoming sensations. Presumably, social animals --- perhaps including some warm-blooded dinosaurs, and their feathered descendants)*4 --- are self-conscious in addition to basic sub-conscious. The author says "I call these expressive responses that evaluate the input ‘sentition’."*5 The evaluation must be in terms of Personal Relevance. Non-social animals may not need to view themselves as "persons" to discriminate between Self and Society.

The author refers to Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which seems to assume that some high-level functions of brain processing supervene --- as a holistic synergy --- on the chemical & electrical activities of the neural net*6. As I interpret that insight, Perception is physical*7, but Conception is metaphysical*8. i.e. Holistic. System functions are different from Component functions. Some Bits of Neural data are useless & valueless (irrelevant) until organized into a holistic system of Self + Other. It puts the data into a comprehensive, more inclusive, context. Added note --- I made up Holistic Synergy, but Google found the term already in use for Holistic Medicine.

Like a cell-phone Selfie, the broad-scope perspective puts Me into the picture. Neuron sensations (data) are impersonal ; Mind feelings (qualia) are personal. Evolutionary survival is enhanced by the ability to see the Self in a broader milieu, as a member of a social group : a community*9. Feeling is a personally relevant evaluation of incoming sensations. This ability to re-present physical as personal is the root of consciousness.



Excerpts from An evolutionary approach to consciousness can resolve the ‘hard problem’ – with radical implications for animal sentience, by Nicholas Humphrey

*1. "Sensation, let’s be clear, has a different function from perception. Both are forms of mental representation : ideas generated by the brain. But they represent – they are about
– very different kinds of things. . . . It’s as if, in having sensations, we’re both registering the objective fact of stimulation and expressing our personal bodily opinion about it."
Note --- In blindsight, the objective data is being processed, but the subjective meaning is missing. Terrence Deacon defines "aboutness" as a reference to something missing, "incompleteness", a lack that needs to be filled.

*2. "The answer is for the responses to become internalised or ‘privatised’. . . . . In this way, sentition evolves to be a virtual form of bodily expression – yet still an activity that can be read to provide a mental representation of the stimulation that elicits it."
Note --- Virtual = not real ; ideal. Representation = copy, not original

*3. "In attempting to answer these questions, we’re up against the so-called ‘hard problem of consciousness’: how a physical brain could underwrite the extra-physical properties of phenomenal experience."
Note --- What he calls "extra physical" I'm calling Meta-physical, in the sense that Ideas are not Real.

*4. My daddy used to say that "chickens wake-up in a new world every day". Maybe their primitive neural systems don't register meaning in the same way as hound dogs.

*5. "To discover ‘what’s happening to me’, the animal has only to monitor ‘what I’m doing about it’. And it can do this by the simple trick of creating a copy of the command signals for the responses – an ‘efference copy’ that can be read in reverse to recreate the meaning of the stimulation."
Note --- Efference copy is a feedback loop, that adds Me to data : supervenience.

*6. "it {consciousness) involves the brain generating something like an internal text, that it interprets as being about phenomenal properties."
Note --- Terrence Deacon " . . . variously defines Reference as "aboutness" or "re-presentation," the semiotic or semantic relation between a sign-vehicle and its object." https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... ts/deacon/

*7. "Sensation, let’s be clear, has a different function from perception. Both are forms of mental representation : ideas generated by the brain. But they represent – they are about – very different kinds of things. Perception – which is still partly intact in blindsight – is about ‘what’s happening out there in the external world’: the apple is red; the rock is hard; the bird is singing. By contrast, sensation is more personal, it’s about ‘what’s happening to me and how I as a subject evaluate it’
Note --- In this case, "sensation" is the visceral Feeling of What Happens to yours truly.

*8. "ask yourself: what would be missing from your life if you lacked phenomenal consciousness?"
Note --- You would lack a sense of Self and self-control and ownership, which is essential for humans in complex societies.

*9. "What about man-made machines?"
Note --- Sentient machines could possibly emerge as they become dependent on social groups to outsource the satisfaction of some of their personal needs.

↪Malcolm Lett