TPF: Mind-Created World

[Gnomon]

Schopenhauer, more than Berkeley. Where I part company with Berkeley, is his dismissal of universals - his nominalism, in short. I think it leaves many gaps in his philosophy. But whenever I read his dialogues, I'm reminded of how ingenious a philosopher he was. — Wayfarer

Although I know very little about medieval philosophy, I get the impression that the debate between Realism and Nominalism would be pertinent to the topic of a Mind-Created World vs whatever the alternative might be : a Self-Existent Material World?

Contrary to the definition below, I naively assumed that Realism could be summarized as "what you see is all there is". Which would exclude Universals & Abstractions & Qualia, and Universal Mind, that are knowable only as ideas. Please comment on those alternative worldviews. Thanks.


Nominalism
The theory that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals are only names or labels for groups of things or events. Nominalists believe that the mind cannot create concepts or images that correspond to universal terms.
Realism
The theory that universals exist in addition to particulars, and that all entities can be categorized as either particulars or universals. Realist philosophies include Platonic realism and the hylomorphic substance theory of Aristotle.
Nominalism and realism were two major theoretical positions in the later Middle Ages, and were particularly important to theological scholars. For example, Thomas Aquinas was a prominent realist philosopher who argued that essence and existence were distinct. William of Ockham was a prominent nominalist philosopher who argued that universals were psychological labels.
___Google AI overview

[Gnomon]

I'm sure that's true, but it isn't obvious to me from the OP or from what I've read in your other posts. The proposition that "reality is created by the mind" at first seems like an attack on physicalism/realism (whichever term you like), but when I look at your explanation in detail the term "reality" instead seems to refer to "our particular conception of reality", which is amounts to a rather humble claim, not really an attack at all. — goremand

Please pardon my intrusion. Yes, ↪Wayfarer is not the type to make arrogant or aggressive attacks on debatable philosophical positions. He's usually more subtly nuanced. And his "humble" approach may seem less impressive than the more arrogant assertions of Scientism.

For example, his stated position in the OP does not deny the physical "reality" (science) that we all sense, but his interpretation also includes some aspects of Idealism (philosophy). I can't speak for Wayfarer, but this thread has been going on for over a year. Yet, some posters still can't reconcile his "proposition", that harks back to the ancient origins of theoretical philosophy, with the Physicalism/Materialism/Realism of modern pragmatic science. Each has it's own purview, but Philosophy specializes in inferred generalizations, not observed details. For philosophers, the "mind-created world" is a Cosmos, not an aggregation of particles. Just keep that distinction in mind.

FWIW, Marc Wittmann Ph.D. --- research fellow at the Institute for Frontier Areas in Psychology and Mental Health in Freiburg, Germany --- recently wrote an article in Psychology Today magazine entitled Physicalism Is Dead*1. It's less an attack on Physicalism/Realism than a presentation of alternative views of the Mind/Body relationship. It's not about specific scientific facts, but about the philosophical interpretation of general principles.

*1. Wittman's key points are :
# The reductionist physicalist position entails that phenomenal consciousness does not exist.
# Scientists increasingly realize that phenomenal consciousness can't be explained by the workings of the brain.
# For idealism, subjectivity undeniably has primacy when it comes to knowledge about ourselves and the world.
# For dual-aspect monism, consciousness and the brain are two different aspects of a same underlying reality.

Note --- Phenomenal Consciousness is the Mind that we experience subjectively, not the Brain that scientists study objectively.
"Yes, phenomenal consciousness is the subjective aspect of experiencing the world. It's the rich, first-person experience of what it's like to be you, including your thoughts, memories, and internal biological processes." ___Google AI overview

Physicalism Is Dead :
Alternative views on the mind-body problem are becoming increasingly popular.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/bl ... sm-is-dead

[Gnomon]

There is nothing arrogant about advancing clear arguments. And I ever said his approach was humble, I said his claim was humble. Meaning: trivial, uncontroversial. — goremand

If the philosophical approach of the OP is "trivial, uncontroversial", then why has it evoked polarized controversial arguments for over a year? Apparently, the relationship of material Reality to mental Mind touches a nerve for some posters on this forum.

The only thing unclear about the OP is that it is not a simplistic Either/Or argument, but as I see it, a sophisticated Both/And position of complementarity*1. Few philosophers would deny that the Real world includes both Matter and Mind. The debate is about how to reconcile that apparent Cartesian duality within a general worldview. Strawson has one solution, and ↪Wayfarer another. What's yours?

*1. Complementarity is the realization that a single thing, when considered from different perspectives, can appear to have different, or even contradictory, properties. Complementarity alerts us that answering different kinds of questions can require radically different approaches.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... mentarity/

What a shame. I'd love to read an attack on physicalism, especially of the eliminativist variety. Though I wouldn't expect much from an article that quotes Galen Strawson, the lamest critic I've ever read. — goremand

Apparently, you like nice neat Either/Or dichotomies. Did you interpret Strawson's position as an attack on Physicalism? Ironically, he claims to be a proponent of Physicalism*2. But how, then, can he say that "physicalism entails panpsychism"? Maybe his position is complementary*2, which you interpret as "lame".

*2. Is Galen Strawson a physicalist?
As a real physicalist, then, I hold that the mental/experiential is physical, and I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is 'really just neurons firing', at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves.
https://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidy ... rawson.pdf
Note --- The subtitle of the linked article is : "Realistic Monism : Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism"

In other words, it is a claim that is compatible with some forms of realism. — goremand

Yes. I think Wayfarer's notion of Mind/World is "compatible" with Realism, in the sense that Mind & Matter are complementary, not oppositions : not one to the exclusion of the other. But it's difficult to articulate that subtle inter-relationship in terms of our matter-oriented language. For example, to say that mind is immaterial, could be interpreted to mean that "mind doesn't matter" : i.e. trivial.

DEATH EATER : gluttonous gourmand or moderate idea consumer?
400px-TrialsofManaGoremand.jpg

[Gnomon]

No, you tend to overinterpret what I write somewhat. I only know Strawson as a critic of eliminativism, and that's the role he plays in the article. — goremand

I don't know anything about Eliminativism, beyond the Wikipedia article that discusses both sides of the argument. But my first impression is that both Materialism/Eliminativism, and Mentalism/Positivism --- or whatever the opposite theory is called --- are metaphysical conjectures, not scientific facts. So, lacking slam-dunk physical evidence pro or con, the argument could go on forever, as in this thread. Therefore, the contrasting views seem to be based on a personal preference for one kind of world or another : tangible, physical stuff vs imaginary, metaphysical*1 concepts.

The Mental world has been interpreted in terms of Souls & Spirits and Ghosts & Goblins ; but also in terms of Intelligence & Information. On the other hand, the Eliminativist position seems to be lacking any notion of a mechanism by which conceptual Qualia, such as Redness & Love could emerge from perceptual Matter by natural means. Hence, your preference for "clear" Black vs White dichotomies seems doomed to frustration. Unless of course, you simply believe one or the other based on Faith. Is that an "overinterpretation" of your Either/Or position?


*1. Metaphysical : relating to "the essentially metaphysical question of the nature of the mind"
___ Oxford dictionary
Note --- Is Mind something that can be dissected by scientists with scalpels, or a holistic function of a material brain, that must be inferred by reason?

[Gnomon]

A preference that can't be justified has no place in a discussion. In this case the justification for eliminativism would be parsimony. — goremand

How do you justify a preference for parsimony? Does it allow you to arbitrarily eliminate the entities you don't like?

Qualitative Experience can't be dissected by scientists, so simply eliminate it as immaterial. But then Metaphysics is all about immaterial ideas, so eliminate Philosophy : yes/no?

Because it can lack firmness and consistency when applied to complex ideas or phenomena, Occam's razor is more commonly seen as a guiding heuristic than as a principle of absolute truth. ___Wikipedia

But of course. Qualia is the very thing to be eliminated, there will be no Love and no Redness. That is not the problem but the solution. — goremand

Perhaps the most parsimonious way to eliminate Qualia is suicide.

[Gnomon]

I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too.
— Janus
I always thought that was the whole point, if qualia does not refer to something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience there's really no use to the word at all. — goremand

This is my point. It is something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience. It is our experience of hearing an A major chord, whereas a machine only detects vibrations of 440, 553.365, and 659.255 Hz.

↪Janus
, I'm not sure I understand what you think is redundant. I don't mean that in a smartass way. I mean I'm not sure what you're saying. — Patterner


I guess what they are saying is that ideas are redundant in a material world. Only the senses of vision, hearing, touch & smell are important for Materialists. Even a blind mindless mole can find a worm without imagining it.

What you experience subjectively in the Cartesian Theatre is immaterial, hence not useful (i.e. redundant). What they are implying is that you are mistaking your abstract mental feeling for a concrete material object. But I'm sure that's not how you feel about it. What is a Philosophy Forum for, it not for sharing subjective Ideas & Feelings encapsulated in artificial words? Do they have a mechanism for sharing Sense Data over the internet?

Since they view Qualia as non-existent, or even superfluous, I assume they don't have any use for the redness or the sweetness of a rose, as long as they can see & smell it. Those qualitative words (and their associated ideas) in our common languages are redundant in a physics lab. All they need is the data. So, when you insist that the rose smells sweet, it's as-if you are reifying an idea. But, really all you are doing is experiencing the sensation.

The bottom line here is that you are speaking a different language (Empirical vs Experiential) from the Materialists. But apparently your attempts at translation have fallen on deaf ears.


"Yes, "qualia" is a philosophical idea that refers to the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience"
"Reifying an idea is the act of treating an abstract concept as if it were a concrete thing".
___Google AI overview

[Gnomon]

↪Janus
, I'm not sure I understand what you think is redundant. I don't mean that in a smartass way. I mean I'm not sure what you're saying. — Patterner

After I wrote the post above, I read this statement in a National Geographic magazine article about Artificial Intelligence. Under the title : Do we have to accept that machines are fallible?, it says "That's a big issue facing AI right now --- these evolving algorithms can hallucinate, a term for what happens when a learning model produces a statement that sounds plausible but has been made up. This is because generative AI applications . . . work functionally as a prediction program".

Most definitions of AI "hallucinations" describe it as "false" data. But if you think of it as "anticipation", it could be useful information for entities that encounter rapid change, as in modern human cultures. The human brain seems to have adapted to deal with complex social networks, in which the ability to anticipate behaviors, or to read other minds would be beneficial.

I suspect that ↪Janus is critical of a crucial function of General Intelligence : that it goes beyond the facts, the raw data, to infer something that is not-yet-real ; maybe even ideal. An imaginary inference exists only as an immaterial idea. Even though it is embodied in a machine or brain, the idea (prediction ; conjecture) is not meaningful or useful except for another predictive intelligence. For a digital computer, not-yet-real data is erroneous information. For AI and human Intelligence, that data may be useful for anticipating future or possible situations. Yes, human brains are fallible, but they are also surprisingly adaptable to evolving realities.

[Gnomon]

I could say something to you right now which would raise your blood pressue and affect your adrenal glands. And in so doing, nothing physical would have passed between us. — Wayfarer
That's just not true. If you are talking about what you write on the computer, then I would be looking at shapes (letters, words and sentences) on a screen which means the light from the screen enters my eyes and stimulates rods and cones, causing nerve impulses which travel to the brain and cause neuronal activity which in turn may or may not raise my blood pressure and affect my adrenal glands. — Janus

What ↪Wayfarer said is true, but what you interpreted is not what he meant. The "shapes" on a computer screen are indeed physical, but it's their meta-physical*1 meaning (forms) that might affect you : first intellectually, and then emotionally, after the threat to your belief system registers in the brain, and causes a series of physical responses to combat the metaphysical threat. Wayfarer is not going to attack you physically, by sending bullets over the internet. Instead, he could affect you metaphysically, by causing you to believe that you have been psychically injured (offended).

Of course, Wayfarer is much too genteel to resort to such underhanded tactics. Ironically, non-physical verbal attacks on odious beliefs are often used by the Physicalist trolls on this forum to counter-attack those who have offended their mentally-constructed non-ideal worldview.

*1. By "meta-physical" I don't mean the study of reality, but merely "non-physical" in the sense of "mental" Ideality*2. Ideas instead of Objects. Forms instead of Shapes.

*2. Ideality :
In Plato’s theory of Forms*3, he argues that non-physical forms (or ideas) represent the most accurate or perfect reality. Those Forms are not physical things, but merely definitions or recipes of possible things. What we call Reality consists of a few actualized potentials drawn from a realm of infinite possibilities.
# Materialists deny the existence of such immaterial ideals, but recent developments in Quantum theory have forced them to accept the concept of “virtual” particles in a mathematical “field”, that are not real, but only potential, until their unreal state is collapsed into reality by a measurement or observation. To measure is to extract meaning into a mind. [Measure, from L. Mensura, to know; from mens-, mind]
# Some modern idealists find that scenario to be intriguingly similar to Plato’s notion that ideal Forms can be realized, i.e. meaning extracted, by knowing minds. For the purposes of this blog, “Ideality” refers to an infinite pool of potential (equivalent to a quantum field), of which physical Reality is a small part.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html
Note --- Quantum Fields are accepted by scientists as accurate depictions of reality (reified), even though they are immaterial mathematical constructs, and cannot be detected by human senses or instruments, but only known by philosophical inference. They seem to be a scientific version of Plato's Forms, or what I call Ideality.

*3. Theory of Forms :
a theory widely credited to the Classical Greek philosopher Plato. The theory suggests that the physical world is not as real or true as Forms.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_forms
Note --- Materialism is a belief system that rejects this theory of an immaterial Potential Source (or Field), from which our sensory perceptions of physical Shapes are constructed into the conception that we call Reality. Plato inferred that the intellectual Meaning (definition) of those Shapes is ultimately more important than their physical instantiation. This idealized notion may apply only to sentient creatures capable of inferring abstract meanings from concrete objects. For philosophers, the Potential Source of Forms is also merely an imaginary Idea, not a sensable thing. It's the meaning that matters, not the substance.

[Gnomon]

↪Wayfarer
it has nothing to do with anything physical. It is only about the meaning. — Patterner

Some people --- writers, artists, designers --- will get more riled-up if someone steals their Intellectual Property*1 than some tangible physical property. Again, it's the meaning that matters to them. But lawyers have to be very creative to convince a jury, using materialistic language, that something of value has indeed been stolen. How do you think the (hypothetical ; intangible) creator of a Mind Created World would feel about h/er creatures denying the value of h/er most important creation : the human intellect?


*1. Intellectual property (IP) is a category of property that includes intangible creations of the human intellect. It's a reflection of someone's creativity and can be found in many things, including: computer games, films, cars, and miracle drugs. ___Google AI overview

Intellectual property rights are the rights given to persons over the creations of their minds.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tr ... tel1_e.htm
2 days ago

[Gnomon]

I find it enjoyably ironic that it might be the case that we lack cognitive ability to determine why we have cognitive abilities. — Tom Storm
Indeed! One of my favorite sci-fi books is Neverness, by David Zindell. In it is a quote attributed to Lyall Watson (I don't know where it is in Watson's writings. Anyway:
If the brain were so simple we could understand it, we would be so simple we couldn't. — Lyall Watson — Patterner


Lyall%20Watson%20quote.png